Moreover, the opportunity cost of doing so was low at first. Qatari expressions of declaratory and material support for opposition movements elsewhere were unlikely to have consequences domestically within Qatar, and such support also played into Qatari efforts to be taken seriously as a responsible actor on the regional and international stage. Both the emir and Hamad bin Jassim vocally championed an approach that prioritized Arab solutions to Arab problems, especially during the run-up to the international intervention in Libya in March The prime minister took the lead in assembling the coalition of support for United Nations UN Security Council Resolution that authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya.
Crucially, Qatar rallied Arab support through the Arab League for the imposition of the no-fly zone. The bloodshed unleashed by a flailing regime with few regional partners or international allies represented a safe target on which to make a high-visibility stand against tyranny and authoritarian misrule. Aside from extending quick diplomatic recognition to the opposition, Qatari Mirage fighters took part in the NATO-led air strikes, and the Qatar-based Libya TV gave the rebels a voice to make their cause heard around the world. NTC chairman Mahmoud Jibril was largely based in Doha throughout the revolution, finding it easier to coordinate action from there than from the ostensible rebel stronghold of Benghazi.
Rather more murkily, Qatar developed close links with key Islamist militia commanders Abdel Hakim Belhadj, of the feared Tripoli Brigade, and the al-Sallabi brothers. Central Intelligence Agency to Libya in before being rehabilitated by the regime in However, neither Qatar nor the UAE coordinated their military assistance to the Libyan opposition and in fact supported different rebel brigades on the ground. This complicated the task of unifying the anti-Qaddafi movement from its earliest phase and contributed to the subsequent splintering of the movement after it came to power in October Yet, as the revolutionary euphoria of gave way to the difficult process of constructing and embedding institutional and accountable governing structures in , it became clear that Qatar was failing to translate short-term gains into long-term influence.
Moreover, while offers of Qatari and other regional and international sources of military and financial support broadly were welcomed during the struggle against the Qaddafi regime, in the feverish atmosphere that followed it became harder for such external actors to avoid the appearance of taking sides and picking winners when political spoils were handed out. However, a world of difference separated the cases of Libya and Syria as flashpoints in the unfolding regional upheaval. Syria became the battleground for proxy wars waged with increasing intensity and ferocity by groups linked to both sides of the regional Sunni-Shia divide.
Within this series of lethal and overlapping conflicts, it was fanciful to suppose that any one country could hope to influence, let alone control, developments on the ground. Yet, whether by accident or design, or simply because Doha was flush from its apparent success in helping to remove Qaddafi from power after forty-two years ruling Libya, this is precisely what the Qatari leadership attempted to do in late and throughout The Arab League—usually known more for its ineffectiveness than for its spasms of decisive action—took the lead in early peacemaking initiatives.
However, neither the suspension of Syria from the Arab League and the imposition of political and economic sanctions in November nor the dispatch of an Arab League observer mission to Syria in January successfully halted the escalating spiral of violence. In part, this was due to emerging rivalries among regional actors over which forces to support in Syria, in addition to a lack of consensus within the Arab League itself over next steps.
An inaugural meeting of a Friends of Syria group, an international coalition, held in February ended in disarray, with the Saudi delegation walking out in protest at the inability to agree on a common stance. Following this failure, the fragile unity of the Arab League faltered. Qatar made clear its distaste for the reluctance of countries such as Iraq and Lebanon to act decisively and began to take a progressively harder line on Syria, publicly imploring the international community to support and arm the opposition to the Syrian government.
In October , Hamad bin Jassim accused the Syrian government of genocide after the failure of yet another four-day ceasefire attempt. Developments over the course of the spring of illustrated the extent to which the Qatari moment was in eclipse, not only in Syria but across the Middle East. In the maelstrom created by the clash between the entrenched power of the old order and the myriad new groups that emerged in transition states, it became manifestly clear that no single actor could control the pace or direction of events.
The protracted and complex political struggles that characterized the post—Arab Spring landscape laid bare the limitations of Qatari capabilities.
Meanwhile, growing tensions with Saudi Arabia and the UAE reflected widening differences in policy approaches toward the Muslim Brotherhood. Tortuous negotiations were then held in Istanbul in May to expand the Syrian National Council, an umbrella opposition group, with particular emphasis placed on including a liberal bloc headed by Michel Kilo and backed by Western and Arab governments.
These additions reflected a Saudi-led attempt to dilute the influence of the Qatar-backed Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the council by broadening its membership and composition. Qatar also provided significant economic support to the transitioning regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Qatari largesse poured into these countries as they emerged from the Arab Spring. Commercial relations between Qatar and Tunisia boomed following the January revolution and subsequent election of a government headed by the Islamist party Ennahda. It is unclear how much money Qatar provided Egypt if any prior to the toppling of the Morsi government in July But Qatar did subsequently honor an agreement to supply five shipments of LNG to cover shortfalls in domestic power generation in Egypt, although a separate long-term gas accord agreed to in principle between Egypt and Qatar in the spring of did not survive the change of regime in Cairo.
This caution reflected a pragmatic analysis of the costs and benefits of taking action in such a sensitive arena. There was far less space for Qatar to act, meaning that policies toward both countries needed to be packaged firmly within GCC-wide approaches.
A global vision hence creates global sympathy or global aversion. International Relations and Shrader, R. By contrast, the Grotian position that I wish to defend understands international human rights as an undertaking by sovereign governments to uphold such rights in their own jurisdictions, but not as an undertaking to confer on a foreign power or international organization any liberty or responsibility to force such humanitarian action by armed intervention. And who has a right to security? While recognizing the possibilities inherent in the breakdown of traditional structures, and it is important that we do, it must be emphasized how privilege is always manifest in the custom of culture and attainment. World Development, 22 3.
Five days before Qatar and the UAE spearheaded Arab League support for the humanitarian intervention in eastern Libya on March 19, , Saudi Arabia led a GCC force into Bahrain to assist in the restoration of law and order following the uprising in February that threatened briefly to push the ruling family to make significant political concessions in response to opposition calls for reform.
Qatar was directly involved in the effort as a member state of the GCC. Although the vast majority of the Peninsula Shield Force that entered Bahrain was composed of members of the Saudi Arabian National Guard and policemen from the UAE, it contained a small number of Qatari troops in addition to a naval contingent from Kuwait. This show of force demonstrated the way in which the concept of intervention assumed different meanings in diverging contexts.
Any far-reaching concessions to political reform by the Bahraini governing elite, arguably the weakest link in the chain of Gulf monarchies, threatened to embolden opposition movements in other GCC states and upset the delicate sectarian balance of Sunni-Shia interests. The Saudis had exercised considerable political and economic influence over its small offshore neighbor long before the Arab Spring.
Broadly similar parameters were seen in Yemen. Like Bahrain, Yemen held special geostrategic and political interest for Saudi Arabia. Mass demonstrations against the thirty-three-year rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh erupted in the capital, Sanaa, in February and spread rapidly to cities and towns across Yemen. Hundreds of thousands of protesters demanded that Saleh step down immediately, their resolve emboldened by elite defections as the political, tribal, and military circles that surrounded Saleh fragmented.
In a rare act of collective action, the GCC proposed a political transition that would ease Saleh out of power in an elite-led and top-down process. Notably, however, the GCC plan had no position for the grassroots pro-democracy movement that had so unexpectedly emerged to challenge and upend the status quo in Yemen.
Instead, it remained wedded to supporting established political actors as GCC leaders sought to bring under control the mobilized populace and guide the transition to the post-Saleh era. After the failure of its attempts to mediate during the Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen in —, Doha fell back on multilateral regional initiatives for dealing with the country.
As part of the Friends of Yemen process that started in following regional and international concern about terrorism originating in Yemen, Qatari and GCC officials worked closely with Western governments to try to stabilize Yemen and prod Saleh toward political reforms. Persistent rumors of Qatari involvement in the Islamist takeover of northern Mali in demonstrated the extent of the skepticism. A military coup in March overthrew the Malian government, after which rebels seized control of the north of Mali and proclaimed an independent state.
The rebels were from the Tuareg ethnic group, and many had fought for Qaddafi in the Libyan armed forces in However, splits between the MNLA and the militant Islamist group Ansar Dine weakened the rebel movement and resulted in the loss of control of the region to Ansar Dine and another fundamentalist organization, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa. As conditions in northern Mali worsened throughout , attention began to focus on the activities of a small team from the Qatari Red Crescent.
This information was said to have originated in a report from the French Directorate of Military Intelligence, although no supporting evidence was provided. The assumption that Qatar was linked to Ansar Dine was a widespread one. There is an attitude that is not cooperative and that can be considered as a form of leniency toward the terrorist groups who occupied northern Mali.
This attitude coming from Qatar is not normal. We need a policy clarification from Qatar who has always denied any role in funding terrorist groups.
On the diplomatic level, Qatar should adopt a much stronger, and firmer position toward these groups who threaten the security of the Sahel region. Comments such as these underscore the very different environment of latent suspicion bordering on outright hostility that Qatari policymakers now face. In the case of Mali, the allegations that Qatari interests whether state-backed or private were funding or arming rebel groups remain unsubstantiated.
VG paperback. A tidy copy in tight binding. More information about this seller Contact this seller 9. Revised edition. Originally published in , this is a collection of papers presented by Muslim women from Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Palestine, The Philippines and Singapore, at a conference held two years earlier.
After two years' circulation in Malaysia it was banned by the Government. However after a three year battle in the Malaysian courts, the book was 'unbanned' in early More information about this seller Contact this seller Published by Sisters in Islam, Kuala Lumpur This is a collection of papers presented at a symposium of Muslim social activists in Kuala Lumpur in to attempt to grapple with the question of how should an Islamic state be run.
While the Prophet Muhammad experimented with a model that recognised the needs of both Muslims and non-Muslims, the less flexible model of the 'Western state' has today tended sideline the openness of early Muslims. In addition there are big differences in time and context between the Medina city state and where Muslims find themselves today. Post free within Malaysia The cover has a bit of wear with a nick at the base of the front cover and a crease on one corner of the back cover.
The binding is tight and the text clear with no tanning throughout. Published by Sisters in Islam About this Item: Sisters in Islam, Condition: Used: Acceptable. Seller Inventory x. Soft cover. Seller Inventory js About this Item: Routledge , Brand new book, sourced directly from publisher. Dispatch time is working days from our warehouse.
Book will be sent in robust, secure packaging to ensure it reaches you securely. Condition: NEW. Thus, characterizations of the state as simply losing significance are inadequate. Such characterizations fail to capture this very important dimension, and reduce what is happening to a function of the duality that splits state and global economy: what one wins, the other loses.
Deregulation marks not simply the state's loss of control. It is also a mechanism for negotiating the juxtaposition of the inter-state consensus to pursue globalization with the fact that national legal systems remain as the major instantiation through which guarantees of contract and property rights are enforced.
At this time, we can identify at least the following in an effort to map the role of the state in these processes. First, the emergent, often imposed consensus in the community of states to further globalization has created a set of specific obligations for participating states. The state remains as the ultimate guarantor of the "rights" of global capital, i.
Firms operating transnationally want to ensure the functions traditionally exercised by the state in the national realm of the economy, notably guaranteeing property rights and contracts. The state here can be conceived of as representing a technical administrative capacity that cannot be replicated at this time by any other institutional arrangement. Furthermore, this is a capacity backed by military power, even global power in the case of some states. This guarantee of the rights of capital is embedded in a certain type of state, a certain conception of the rights of capital, and a certain type of international legal regime.
It is largely embedded in the states of the most developed and most powerful countries in the world, in Western notions of contract and property rights, and in a new legal regime aimed at furthering economic globalization . The state continues to play a crucial, though no longer exclusive role in the production of laws around these new forms of economic activity.
Capturing Globalization (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics) [James H Mittelman, Norani Othman] on donextturnewsra.tk *FREE*. Editorial Reviews. Review. "Contributors from three continents write about the objectives and Capturing Globalization (Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics) - Kindle edition by James H Mittelman, Norani Othman. Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets.
Secondly, while central, the role of the state in producing the legal encasements for economic operations is no longer what it was in earlier periods. Economic globalization has been accompanied by the creation of new legal regimes and legal practices and by the expansion and renovation of some older forms that bypass national legal systems.
This is evident in the rising importance of international commercial arbitration and the variety of institutions which fulfill rating and advisory functions that have become essential for the operation of the global economy. Third, what is generally called deregulation actually refers to an extremely complex set of intersections and negotiations which, while preserving the integrity of national territory as a geographic condition, do transform the exclusive authority of the state over its territory, i.
The discussion in the preceding sections brings to the fore the distinction between national territory and the exclusive authority of the state.